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Securit y
When Is a Cyberattack 
a Use of Force or an 
Armed Attack?
N ews reports and public discussion about cyber-attacks appear daily in traditional and social 
media. Cyberattacks used in the 
commission of crimes, such as steal-
ing customer credit card information, 
defacing websites, distributing child 
pornography via file-sharing sites, 
and creating and leasing out bot-
nets, have become commonplace. 
Moreover, cyberattacks that once 
were considered extraordinary—in 
particular, those carried out as part 
of state-sponsored military or intelli-
gence operations—will likely increase 
in frequency and severity.
RECENT CYBERATTACKS
Several such cyberattacks have 
occurred recently. For instance, 
the US, together with Israel, alleg-
edly used two sophisticated viruses, 
Flame and Stuxnet, to disrupt 
Iran’s petroleum production and 
distribution infrastructure and 
its uranium-enrichment facilities 
(E. Nakashima, G. Miller, and J. Tate, 
“U.S., Israel Developed Flame Com-
puter Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear 
Efforts, Officials Say,” The Washington 
Post, 19 June 2012). 
Another cyberattack targeted 
human rights activists acting on 
behalf of ethnic Uyghurs in the Xinji-
ang Uyghur Autonomous Region and 
other parts of China (B. Prince, “Mac, 
Windows Malware Campaign Targets 




The attackers—allegedly working for 
the People’s Republic of China—used 
relatively unsophisticated malware, 
in the form of a Trojan horse that 
installs a rootkit, to track the Uyghur 
activists’ activities and exfiltrate data 
from their computers.
Even the Arab uprisings have seen 
cyberattacks. Recently, a group of 
progovernment Syrian hacktivists, 
who call themselves the Syrian Elec-
tronic Army, conducted cyberattacks 
against Al-Arabiya News, Al-Jazeera, 
and other news organizations that 
it accused of spreading misinforma-
tion about the widening conflict in 
Syria (P.J. Watson, “Syrian Hacktiv-
ists Launch Al-Jazeera Cyber Attack,” 
Infowars, 5 July 2012; www.infowars.
com/syrian-activists-launch-al-
jazeera-hack-attack).
Although cyberattacks involving 
military or intelligence operations 
could violate domestic or interna-
tional law, they don’t always rise to 
the level of a use of force or armed 
attack under the international law 
that governs the legality of the use of 
force, also known as jus ad bellum. 
Judging by the dialogue so far, 
people who aren’t well versed in 
international law frequently mis-
characterize the legal nature of 
cyberattacks. This is unfortunate 
because the legality of cyberattacks 
under jus ad bellum, as well as any 
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with kinetic or nonkinetic means, 
as long as the response is necessary 
under the circumstances and uses no 
more force than required to defend 
the state. 
ARMED ATTACKS VERSUS 
CYBERATTACKS
Did the Flame virus constitute 
a use of force or an armed attack 
triggering the right of self-defense? 
According to The Washington Post, 
“the massive piece of malware 
secretly mapped and monitored 
Iranian computer networks, sending 
back a steady stream of intelligence 
to prepare for a cyberwarfare cam-
paign.” Given only this information 
about the cyberoperation, this was 
neither a use of force by any state that 
might have launched it, nor an armed 
attack that would permit the victim 
state to respond with its own use of 
force. Although the attackers used 
Flame to gather intelligence about 
a military target (petroleum-export 
facilities), they didn’t physically 
damage those facilities or otherwise 
render them inoperable. 
The use of Stuxnet against Iran’s 
uranium-enrichment facilities is more 
difficult to categorize. Because the 
facilities suffered physical damage, 
the attack qualifies as a use of force 
and, unless the attacking state was 
acting in self-defense, the operation 
violates international law. Iran can 
respond legally with a use of force 
only if the operation targeting it quali-
fies as an armed attack owing to its 
gravity. Because the precise scale 
and effects necessary to qualify the 
operation as an armed attack are 
uncertain in international law, this 
matter remains unresolved. 
The use of the Backdoor OSX 
MaControl.b malware against Uyghur 
activists was not in violation of the 
use of force prohibition because it 
fell below the use of force threshold: 
it was a limited-scale intelligence-
gathering operation that caused no 
physical damage to the targeted 
computing devices. Moreover, under 
international law, it is questionable 
whether the use of force prohibi-
tion applies when a state uses force 
against a nonstate actor (although the 
state might violate other aspects of 
international law). 
Because the Syrian Electronic 
Army is not a state, the use of force 
prohibition does not apply—although, 
again, the cyberattacks might violate 
other aspects of international and 
domestic law. Even if the prohibition 
had applied, the Syrian Electronic 
Army’s cyberattack on Al-Jazeera’s 
@AJStream Twitter account did not 
measurably damage computing sys-
tems and thus would not qualify as a 
use of force: it only served as a means 
for the group to send tweets contain-
ing its version of events transpiring 
in Syria. 
Similarly, the group’s defacement 
of the Al-Arabiya News website would 
not qualify. In this case, the relevant 
legal question was whether these 
actions amounted to an armed attack 
that would justify a forceful response 
by states in which the media organi-
zations were located. In light of the 
absence of physical damage, they 
clearly didn’t.
Not all cyberattacks are uses of force or armed attacks. In fact, no cyberattack to 
date has been proven to be an armed 
attack. However, it’s technically fea-
sible to carry out armed attacks in 
cyberspace, and some states have 
publicly acknowledged that cyber-
operations are an indispensible part 
of modern warfare.
response to such actions, depends on 
whether these attacks reach particu-
lar legal thresholds.
ARMED ATTACKS IN 
CYBERSPACE
International customary law (legal 
norms that have developed through 
state practice), now codified in UN 
Charter Article 2(4), provides that 
states are prohibited from engaging 
in the use of force. When they do so, 
they violate international law unless 
they are granted authorization from 
the UN Security Council to conduct 
the operation or are responding to 
an armed attack. The latter justifica-
tion, set forth in UN Charter Article 
51, reflects customary international 
law. This raises the question of when 
a cyberattack amounts to an armed 
attack that permits the victim state to 
respond with the use of force. 
The applicable lex lata (the law cur-
rently governing conflict) predates 
the modern computing era. It was 
intended to address concerns about 
kinetic and other noncyber forms of 
warfare. Nevertheless, legal experts 
agree that international law applies 
to cyberoperations because they can 
potentially have effects equivalent to 
those realized via noncyber (kinetic) 
means.
Although no precise definition 
exists for the term “use of force” 
under international law, most experts 
agree that it includes cyberattacks 
that cause physical damage or injure 
individuals. An “armed attack” is a 
use of force carried out by an organ of 
a state, an entity working on a state’s 
behalf, or an organized nonstate 
group that results in “grave” scale 
and effects. 
Although there is no bright-line 
scale-and-effects test to distinguish 
grave from nongrave consequences, 
legal experts generally agree that to 
qualify as an armed attack, a cyber-
attack must result in death or a 
significant degree of injury to persons 
or physical damage to property. Once 
it does, the victim state can respond 
Legal experts generally 
agree that to qualify as 
an armed attack, a cyber-
attack must result in 
death or a significant  
degree of injury to per-
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To fully understand these aspects 
of the jus ad bellum, readers should 
look for the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare, to be published in early 
2013 by Cambridge University Press. 
This book summarizes, in the form 
of black-letter rules and extensive 
commentary, the consensus among 
today’s top legal experts on how inter-
national law applies to cyberwarfare. 
It should prove useful to policy-
makers and legal advisers involved 
in determining proposed cyber- 
operations’ legality. 
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